>PLACEBO-CONTROLLED, RANDOMIZED, OBSERVER-BLIND, DOSE-FINDING STUDY TO EVALUATE THE SAFETY, TOLERABILITY, IMMUNOGENICITY, AND EFFICACY OF SARS-COV-2 RNA VACCINE CANDIDATES AGAINST COVID-19 IN HEALTHY INDIVIDUALS
This means that some portion of the vaccines administered are actually just placebos.
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-04 5:32
g/thread/105796161
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-04 5:44
g/thread/105796225
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-04 6:07
/g/thread/105796331
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-04 22:28
//campaign:Xonotic 0.6 //"game","mapname","bots","skill","fraglimit","timelimit","mutator-sets","description","long description" "dm","g-23","5","2","15",,,"Deathmatch: Docking Station G-23","Welcome to Xonotic!\nWe'll start off easy with Deathmatch against 4 Botlike bots on G-23. Xonotic is mainly a multiplayer game, but before jumping into online games it can be a good idea to practice a bit versus bots." "tdm","afterslime","5","2",,"5",,"Team Deathmatch: Afterslime","Next we'll try some 3v3 Team Deathmatch on Afterslime. You'll have to do your best for five minutes, because the team with the highest score will be the winning team!" "ctf","lightspeed","9","3","3",,,"Capture The Flag: Lightspeed","In CTF you have to take the other teams flag and bring it to your base. Also your own flag has to be in your base for a successful capture! 3 captures to win. " "dm","xoylent","4","3","15",,,"Deathmatch: Xoylent","Again a DM match, but the bots are slighty better now.\nWatch your step!" "lms","glowplant","6","4","9",,,"Last Man Standing: Glowplant","You will have 9 lives in this gamemode and the goal is not to run out of lives before the others do!" "kh","stormkeep","5","4","1000",,,"Key Hunt: Stormkeep","Every team holds a key. You have to collect them (kill key holders and pick them up) and meet with the other key holder in your team." "ons","courtfun","7","5","5",,,"Onslaught: Courtfun","In Onslaught you have to control generators and get generators of the other team by destroying them. The main goal is to destroy their main generator." "dm","red-planet","8","5","15",,"g_nix 0; g_defaultstartsomegunsweaponset 2","[Specialx] Deathmatch: Red Planet","NixNex: In this mode everyone will spawn with the same weapon, but the weapon will change randomly after some time." "keepaway","drain","6","6","15",,,"Keepaway: Drain","Pick up the ball and frag everything that moves!" "rc","leave_em_behind","0","0","2300",,,"Race: Leave'em Behind","It's a race so run as fast as you can! You can try to boost yourself with the Laser if you shoot at the wall or under your feet. To proceed you need to get a time under 23 seconds." "dm","afterslime","5","6","15",,"g_minstagib 1","[Special] Deathmatch: Afterslime","MinstaGib! Everyone has got one weapon - the MinstaNex. Your opponent will be dead if you hit him with it (unless he picked up a powerup like 'Extra Life')." "ctf","newtonian-nightmare","7","7","5",,,"Capture The Flag: Newtonian Nightmare","This space map got very special jumppads. Watch out..." "tdm","stormkeep","5","7","20",,,"Team Deathmatch: Stormkeep","Another 3v3 TDM match.\nTip: You can shoot through warpzones!" //"nexball","nexballarena","5","7","5",,,"Nexball: Nexball Arena","This is similar to football now. You move the ball if you hit it, so try to push it into the ememies goal. First team who can score 5 goals wins!" "dom","glowplant","5","8","50",,,"Domination: Glowplant","If you control the control points and frag enemies in meanwhile you won't have any problems to win." "as","techassault","7","8","30",,"g_campaign_forceteam 1","Assault: Techassault","You are in the attacking team and you have to destroy all objects. There will be new rooms/ways if you destroy an object." "cts","courtfun","0","0","6000",,,"Race Complete The Stage: Courtfun","Race CTS is similar to the Race mode, just that you only need to reach the finish in CTS. You have to beat it within 1 minute though." "dm","xoylent","2","8","10",,"g_weaponarena laser","[Special] Deathmatch: Xoylent","Laser only: This time you get only the Laser, so try to push the enemies of the map! But don't let them push you, because you need only 10 frags to win." "dm","darkzone","5","9","15",,,"Deathmatch: Darkzone","In this DM game you will face 5 Pro bots!" "ctf","space-elevator","7","9","5",,,"Capture The Flag: Space Elevator","CTF versus a team of Pro bots! 5 captures to win." //"freezetag","g-23","7","9","5",,,"Freeze Tag: Docking Station G-23","In Freeze Tag you have to freeze enemies (kill them). Your team gets a point if the other team is completly frozen. It's a team game, so help you teammates and revive them if they are frozen by standing close to them." "ctf","dance","5","10","3",,"g_minstagib 1; g_grappling_hook 1","[Special] Capture The Flag: Dance","MinstaGib in CTF this time. Also you will experience here how to play the Grappling Hook (Press 'E' to use it)!" //"rune","darkzone","5","10","50",,,"Runematch: Darkzone","In a Runematch you can pick up relics and they will give you some extra powers - some are good, some not." "rc","stormkeep","0","0","2900",,,"Race: Stormkeep","This time you can use any weapon to boost yourself. You have to complete the map under 29 seconds!" //"ca","runningman","7","10","5",,,"Clan Arena: Running Man","Clan Arena is basically Team LMS. Once you die you have to spectate. If one entire team is dead the other team gets 1 point." "dm","glowplant","4","11","20",,,"[FINAL] Deathmatch: Glowplant","In this final match you face 4 Godlike bots and you have to get 20 frags to win and complete the campaign! After this you should be ready for fights versus real people." "dm","stormkeep","9","11",15",,"g_weaponarena rocketlauncher","[Bonus] Rocket hell!","Deathmatch: Stormkeep\nOnly the Rocket Launcher will be available - don't blow up yourself! Have fun!"
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-04 22:28
g_nix is the prob, precache's all weaps.
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-04 22:32
The issue is that uses the g_nix 1 setting: which precaches all the weapon models. in the [Special} DM 8: which is in xonotic--maps.pk3 /data/maps/campaignxonticbeta.txt
At summary judgment, the district court rejected Dynegy's claims that Carson's continued at-will employment constituted sufficient consideration, as such employment — which Dynegy was free to terminate at any time — was merely an illusory promise. The district court, however, was persuaded that the consideration requirement was satisfied by Dynegy's (i) nominating Carson for a company award consisting of a monetary prize, (ii) planning to award Carson with an annual end-of-year bonus, and (iii) recommending Carson for a promotion. The district court determined that it was immaterial that Carson never received the company award payment, annual bonus, or promotion, because he would have received these benefits had he not been fired due to circumstances and events unrelated to this litigation.
We decline to adopt the district court's conclusion that the monetary award, annual bonus, and promotion, none of which Carson received, were sufficient to establish consideration under Lulirama. To determine whether such non-received benefits can be deemed consideration in the context of an employee-at-will relationship, we examine Texas law. Under Texas contract law,
We apply Texas law because "[t]he district court in this case applied Texas law and the parties do not dispute the propriety of that approach. . . ." Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Azrock Industries Inc., 211 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing N.K. Parrish, Inc. v. Southwest Beef Indus. Corp., 638 F.2d 1366, 1370 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1981)).
[a]t-will employees may contract with their employers on any matter except those which would limit the ability of either employer or employee to terminate the employment at will. Consideration for a promise, by either the employee or the employer in an at-will employment, cannot be dependent on a period of continued employment. Such a promise would be illusory because it fails to bind the promisor who always retains the option of discontinuing employment in lieu of performance. (Citations omitted.) When illusory promises are all that support a purported bilateral contract, there is no contract. In short, we hold that "otherwise enforceable agreements" can emanate from at-will employment so long as the consideration for any promise is not illusory.
Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Tex. 1994); accord Kadco Contract Design Corp. v. Kelly Servs., 38 F.Supp.2d 489, 495-96 (S.D.Tex. 1998). Here, the supposed consideration, eligibility for various cash awards and promotion, were dependent upon Carson's continued employment with Dynegy. When Carson was terminated, he was disqualified from receiving this putative consideration. Dynegy was not bound by any of these supposed promises because it could — and did — discontinue Carson's employment at its discretion, thereby unilaterally revoking its promises. And, such illusory promises are, as a matter of law, insufficient to constitute adequate consideration. See Light, 883 S.W.2d at 644-45.
Accordingly, as consideration was not present, any license ostensibly granted to Dynegy was revocable by Carson. Carson, of course, did revoke this license by complaining to Dynegy of its use of 24HA and by filing this lawsuit. See, e.g., Keane Dealer Services, Inc. v. Harts, 968 F.Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that issuance of a lawsuit is sufficient to constitute revocation of a license). As any license obtained by Dynegy was revocable, and clearly revoked by Carson, we need not address whether a nonexclusive implied license was even created or the scope of such a license.
Even if Dynegy has no irrevocable license to use 24HA, Carson nevertheless is estopped from the instant infringement claim, as the district court appropriately recognized. Although there is no on-point circuit authority articulating the elements of estoppel as a defense to a copyright infringement allegation, a consensus has developed that a copyright defendant must prove four conjunctive elements to establish estoppel in such cases:
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-07 4:16
(1) the plaintiff must know the facts of the defendant's infringing conduct;
(2) the plaintiff must intend that its conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the defendant has a right to believe that it is so intended;
(3) the defendant must be ignorant of the true facts; and
(4) the defendant must rely on the plaintiff's conduct to its injury.
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-07 4:17
Carson challenges that elements (i), (iii), and (iv) of the estoppel test have been satisfied by uncontroverted evidence. Specifically, Carson argues that he did not know that Dynegy continued to use 24HA after his termination until shortly before he wrote his first letter to Dynegy, asserting that he owned the worksheet and asking that Dynegy cease using it. In essence, then, Carson asserts that his knowledge of Dynegy's use of 24HA prior to his termination is not relevant; rather, he claims that Dynegy's conduct only after Carson's termination is relevant with respect to the first estoppel element. Furthermore, Carson argues that there is a factual dispute regarding whether Dynegy knew that Carson created and had rights in 24HA. Finally, Carson argues that Dynegy's receipt of Carson's letter precludes the argument that Dynegy could establish any reasonable detrimental reliance. This final argument is again dependent upon Carson's assumption that only the state of affairs after the termination — rather than the state of affairs before it — are relevant to the estoppel analysis.
As an initial matter, there is no factual dispute that Dynegy was ignorant of the facts as alleged by Carson. See 4 Nimmer § 13.07. While Carson argues that it was widely known that he owned the 24HA worksheet, the record militates to the contrary. Indeed, there is evidence that Carson encouraged the adaptation, modification, and preparation of a derivative program for other Dynegy employees to use. Carson, moreover, permitted multiple persons to access the password for 24HA. Despite Carson's claim that his co-workers knew that 24HA was his property, he admitted that he never explicitly told anyone that the worksheet could not be modified or used unless he was present and he never appeared to correct the impression among some of Dynegy's employees that 24HA was a team-created program.
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-07 4:18
All that now stands in the way of endorsing the district court's estoppel determination is Carson's argument that it was improper to consider events prior to his termination in the analysis of estoppel elements (i) and (iv). While there is no controlling case on the matter, one district court, when confronted with similar facts, did not hesitate to consider the parties' conduct during the course of the plaintiff's employment to confront the estoppel issue.
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-07 4:19
the estoppel issue. See Quinn, 23 F.Supp.2d at 753. In Quinn, the plaintiff, a staff attorney employed by the City of Detroit, created a computer program designed to help the office run more efficiently. Id. at 743. Although the plaintiff consented to the office's use of the program for a number of years, he attempted to withdraw such consent after other employees at the office attempted to modify the program without first obtaining permission. Id. at 743-44. And, this attempt to keep the City from using the program occurred during the time that the plaintiff was employed by the City. Id. After citing to the four-factor estoppel test, the district court determined that the plaintiff was estopped from pursuing an infringement claim because the City had, for years, relied on the plaintiff's permission to use the program and had become dependent upon it, abandoning its prior system. Id. at 753. Thus, the court held that at some point between the time that the City began using the program and the time that the plaintiff first attempted to assert his rights approximately three years later, the plaintiff became estopped from withdrawing his consent because of the City's reliance and the plaintiff's past grant of permission. Id. Thus, if Quinn were controlling, Dynegy's estoppel argument would prevail, as Quinn clearly contemplates consideration of the parties' conduct during the time in which the plaintiff is employed by the defendant. Indeed, all the relevant conduct in Quinn was "pre-termination," as the plaintiff there had not been terminated.
These elements are that the party to be estopped must know the facts of the defendant's infringing conduct and that the defendant must rely on the plaintiff's conduct to his injury. See 4 Nimmer § 13.07. It is clear from the record that both of these elements are satisfied, provided it is proper to consider events prior to Carson's termination.
Yet, as Quinn is not binding precedent, we are not obliged to accept its reasoning if we deem it faulty
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-07 4:19
Yet, as Quinn is not binding precedent, we are not obliged to accept its reasoning if we deem it faulty. An analysis of the opinion in Quinn, however, demonstrates its virtues. Indeed, Quinn permits courts to consider the relationship of employers and workers, such as the plaintiff in that case and Carson in this matter, during the course of employment to determine whether estoppel should be an available defense.
Name:
Anonymous2025-07-07 4:22
Microsystems, to the contract-law condition-covenant distinction. 135 The key requirements for the existence of a contract would be acceptance of the license by Katzer and consideration. Neither topic was addressed carefully by the court. The court’s discussion of the acceptance issue was limited to this statement: “The downloadable files contain copyright notices and refer the user to a ‘COPYING’ file, which clearly sets forth the terms of the Artistic License.” 136 But other courts have refused to accept that being pointed toward a license is acceptance of it, as the discussion above of shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses illustrates. 137 The court addressed the consideration issues somewhat more explicitly, if not more satisfactorily. The court’s basic approach focused on the collaborative aspect of open-source work: Through such collaboration, software programs can often be written and debugged faster and at lower cost than if the copyright holder were required to do all of the work independently. In exchange and in consideration for this collaborative work, the copyright holder permits users to copy, modify and distribute the software code subject to conditions that serve to protect downstream users and to keep the code accessible. 138 But this is not a valid theory of consideration. Some licensees of open-source programs no doubt contribute to the debugging and improvement of the programs, but not all do. More to the point, none of them promise to do so, so there is no promise that would constitute consideration. 139 The court also offered other possibilities based on more specific requirements in the license: “The choice to exact consideration in the form of compliance with the open source requirements of disclosure [of the source of software] and explanation of changes, rather than as
a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal recognition.” 140 But this does not constitute valid consideration either. A gift is not consideration, nor is a conditioned gift. 141 So, for example, if an offeror said, “I will give you $3000 if you promise to use it to buy a car,” a commitment to use the money to buy a car would not be consideration. That is so because in the exchange the recipient gives up no legal right, having had no prior right to the money or to any particular use of it. For the same reason, a licensee’s commitment to use offered software in a particular way cannot constitute consideration. Because the licensee has no right prior to the license to use the software in any way, a grant of only limited uses of it is merely a gift. The fact that the giver could have been even more generous by granting use of the software with no restrictions does not alter this conclusion. It is still the case that the licensee has not given up anything. Only if the licensee gives up some right, says contract law, will there be valid consideration. 142 So the license in Jacobsen appears not to have constituted a valid contract. Jacobsen, the copyright owner, conceded (or contended) as much. 143 Yet the Federal Circuit appeared to consider it important to address acceptance (even if obliquely) and consideration. 144 This presumably is evidence of the court’s view, consistent with its patent cases, that a license must be a contract. As in Mallinckrodt, however, the court in Jacobsen was quite creative in determining that such a contract exists.
The father of Magnetohydrodynamics. Galactic plasma fields and magnetic shifts? Him. The Plasma model of the universe? Him. The best model for the magnetic pole excursion? Him again.
Always sad and gross to see the hypocrisy of genAI image bros whose shiny toys were built on plundering the Internet for training images without regard for copyrights or licensing, but who still somehow think that *their* copyrights and licenses should mean shit for some reason. It's all good when it benefits *them* I guess.