Cinavia Copyright Protection

Holy shit niggers:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinavia

The watermarking and steganography facility provided by Cinavia is designed to stay within the audio signal and to survive all common forms of audio transfer, including lossy data compression using discrete cosine transform, MP3, DTS, or Ogg Vorbis. It is designed to survive digital and analogue sound recording and reproduction via microphones, direct audio connections and broadcasting, and does so by using audio frequencies within the hearing range. It is monaural and not a multichannel codec.

o Only a single channel of audio is required to detect the watermark
o The watermark is able to survive re-recording through a microphone
o The watermark can be detected through "the production, duplication, distribution, broadcast, and consumer handling of recorded content"
o Different copies of otherwise identical works can be distinguished

Let's brainstorm ways to extract the waveform pattern from this!

>>13
Ah, then thanks. It does many of the things I have theorized about, but never got around to making one. It's been there for the past 3 years, so I assume some DRM devices have implementations of Cinavia (a pun on "Cine via?"). But like in theoretical example of supplanted devices with DRM, it would be unfavorable for everyone, like >>9 concluded as well.

>>16
It would be used for identifying the transmission is genuine, an authentication mechanism. So we know it comes from the proper speaker, not an impersonation. In a conference, you would allot how many participants will actually be joining, create ephemeral identities for each with this algorithm, and pool them to the same forum. Thus securing the identity of the participants from impersonators.

Leaking then would be an insecurity/weakness of of the participants, not the authentication system. You can make the outgoing transmission, what the participants receive, also have an unique session audiomark, making the recording identifiable on the leaked audio. There's nothing in the specifications that dampens the quality of identifiabl-ity with multiple audiomarks.

gpg2 --detach-sign work

We both know ANYONE can copy and distribute a public key, and the work. But the specification is to embed an audiomark INTO the work, that can be verified by itself as the only input. Which is why I mention more than once, it would be awesome if you can apply PGP into this specification, additionally optional or not.

It's not [i]really[/i] DRM, it's just cryptography or digital locks.

No, the correct line is the one below #DigitalLocks:
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#DigitalRightsManagement

“Digital Rights Management” (abbreviated “DRM”) refers to technical mechanisms designed to impose restrictions on computer users. [...] Good alternatives include “Digital Restrictions Management,”

I used the abbreviation of the technical concept of hardware built with restrictions for the user, which has its own market and necessity (e.g. security systems). When I use it, I mean restricted access controlled devices/hardware. The commonly accepted words for commodity hardware sold to the masses with such restrictions are called Digital rights management (DRM) devices (whether intentionally described on the device or not by the manufacturer|seller). If you do not concur with the commonly accepted definition, be sure to let wikipedians know, or just edit the article:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Rights_Management

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people would isolate an exact sample of the signal and then blast it through loudspeakers in public places, thus disrupting everyone's recording devices. The possibilities for abuse are endless.

That is one hell of a specific experiment to carryout, if the devices had microphones, and the input received should be reviewed by the implementation of the technology. Not all devices will be used the same with this technology; specially for all fields.